



AUDITOR'S OFFICE



JUVENILE DETENTION OVERTIME AUDIT

REPORT NO. 18-01

June 13, 2018

Compliance with Audit Standards

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained in this audit does provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives.

Executive Summary

Between 2013 and 2015, the Clark County Juvenile Detention Program did not maintain stable juvenile detention officer staffing levels causing it to exceed its adopted budget. The goal of this audit was to identify the major factors that caused the program to exceed its budget and determine if the core issues were adequately addressed.

The key factors that negatively affected management’s ability to staff detention services within their budget between 2013 and 2015 were:

1. Management was neither collecting nor using performance data to identify service levels needed or service levels being provided.
2. Management was not conducting periodic staffing analysis of the detention function to understand and manage detention officer staffing.
3. The availability of juvenile detention officers for scheduled work decreased between 2011 and 2014 due to greater use of scheduled leave and protected time off. This was demonstrated by increased overtime and reduced the pool of available personnel resources to fill overtime.
4. Supplementing operations with temporary staff provided flexible, low cost staff labor. Management ended the program in 2015 to reduce perceived risk to the on-call staff. The only sources of additional labor remaining were overtime or compensatory time, both at higher cost.

A lack of required data hampered management’s efforts to provide staffing at a consistent level and cost. Staffing decisions with significant financial impact were made with a minimum of performance data. Management attempted to address the increasingly severe staffing shortage with overtime even as they phased out the use of temporary staff. By 2014, management recognized their efforts to control costs were ineffective and they sought professional assistance with a staffing analysis by a recognized expert in the field. That analysis, based on data provided by the Juvenile Court, indicated detention officer staff was less available to work than originally expected and declining. In 2011-2014 the program was consuming overtime, compensatory time and contract labor at higher levels than previously used to provide the same level of service for far fewer detainees.

We recommend conducting a best-practice staffing analysis on an annual basis. We also recommend using a performance management framework for a consistent, objective process of data collection, analysis and reporting to improve both service quality and level of service.

If the factors identified in this audit are addressed, the likelihood of the Juvenile Detention Program exceeding its budget to meet minimum service standards is low.




Figure 11: Detainees, officers and work hours over time (ea.5)

We thank the Court, management, and staff for their cooperation in this audit.

This Page
Intentionally
Blank

Table of Contents

1. Table of Contents	5
2. Introduction & Background	6
3. Findings & Recommendations	11
Finding 1: Analysis of operational data will improve overtime management.....	11
Finding 2: Additional efforts are required to manage non-post hours.....	13
Finding 3: Current scheduling practices may reduce effectiveness of coverage.....	14
Finding 4: Effective use of temporary resources improves operations.....	15
Finding 5: Performance management framework should help improve processes.....	16
4. Audit Summary	17
5. Appendices	19
6. Appendix A: Summary of Findings and Recommendations	20
7. Appendix B: Key Event Timeline	21
8. Appendix C: Abbreviation and Keyword Glossary	22
9. Appendix D: Audit Methodology	23
10. Appendix E: Pending New Washington State Guidelines	25
11. Appendix F: National Institutes of Corrections Staffing Tool Summary	26
12. Appendix G: Detailed Juvenile Detention Staffing	27
13. Appendix H: Management Comments	31

Introduction & Background

The Juvenile Court

The Clark County Juvenile Court is a division of the Clark County Superior Court and operates under the administrative authority of the Clark County Superior Court Judges. By state law, Juvenile Court is administered by Superior Court and is a mandatory function of a county. (RCW 13.04.116) Except as otherwise provided within statute, in Clark County the Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles who violate criminal laws and who are in need of protection and/or advocacy as a result of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.

The Juvenile Court’s focus is on helping Clark County’s youth. Within Juvenile Court, the Juvenile Detention Services is given responsibility of youth that require a safe and secure place for them to be detained. Juvenile Court coordinates a wide array of external services while providing a controlled environment for high risk youth. The program provides twenty-four hour a day service intended to keep high risk youth safe while providing a healthy environment to reinforce positive social behavior.

Juvenile Court Organization

Juvenile Court is organized into four programs: Detention; Probation and Community Services; Court Services; and Fiscal/Administrative Services. The Juvenile Court is authorized 93 full time employees of which 87 positions are currently filled. Six of the positions are for temporary employees.

The focus of this audit was the Juvenile Detention program. The largest program within Juvenile Court, it consists of 31 employees and represents about one-third of all staff within the Juvenile Court. Employees currently include 24 juvenile detention officers, 5 leads, a Detention Supervisor, and a Detention Services Manager. (See figure 1)




Figure 1: Organization Chart (ed.5)

Juvenile Court Budget

Juvenile Court receives funding from multiple governments to support its operations, including Clark County and Washington State. The 2017/2018 Juvenile Court budget totals \$18.3m, 15% of which is grant funds.

Figure 2 is the Juvenile Court's 2017-2018 biennial budget allocated by major program. Detention Services consumes a third of the budget, approximately equal to the percentage of staff they represent. It includes \$323,922 in budgeted overtime for the biennium.




Figure 2: Juvenile Court Budget, About 1/3 goes to Detention Services (ea.16)

Juvenile Detention Services Program

Through the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 youth have the right to be incarcerated under safe and healthy conditions. Juvenile detention officers are responsible for providing safe and healthy conditions for youth who are housed securely in the juvenile detention facility. Youth in detention may be held while awaiting their court dates, after their court date as part of their sentence, or while waiting to be transferred to a state facility. Juveniles are detained for their own personal safety and that of the public.

Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI)

In the early 2000s, experiments with changing rules for juvenile detention reduced detainee populations throughout the United States. Between 2008 and 2013 Clark County's average daily population (ADP) of detainees dropped from 62 to 33. Building on this success in an effort to both improve outcomes and reduce cost, in 2013 Clark County became the 9th jurisdiction in Washington State to fully enroll in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI). The initiative involved using alternatives to detention for certain lower risk youth in lieu of standard detention practices. Following the standards recommended by JDAI, the County was able to further reduce the juvenile detainee population to 24 by the end of 2013.

Juvenile Detention Facility

Detention Services is located in the Robert L. Harris Juvenile Justice Center at 500 West 11th St in Vancouver. Built in 2000, the facility is designed with a maximum capacity of 56 to 60 detainees, housed in four approximately equal "pods" or living units. Each pod consists of thirteen or fifteen cells, a dormitory style room, an education classroom and an eating/recreation area and a common area indoor gym. Due to the success of JDAI in reducing the detainee population, one pod was closed in December 2013 and another in September 2014. As of September, 2014 the facility operates two pods with a maximum capacity of approximately 28 detainees.



Photo 1: Juvenile Court Building

The juvenile detention facility is organized under a direct supervision detention model and combines a central observation station with one or two juvenile detention officers physically stationed within each pod of detainees. The central observation station is staffed 24 hours a day. The communications and observation station is currently receiving a major upgrade to the cameras, recording, and communications systems.

In 2013-2015, staffing for juvenile detention consisted of three, eight hour shifts of juvenile detention officers with a Lead or Acting Lead for each shift. Shifts were referred to as Day, Swing and Graveyard. Each of the shifts required different levels of staffing based on the detainee population, the number of living pods open, and activities during the shift. (See Appendix G for details on staffing)

Staffing Resources

There were four categories of staffing resources or tools available in the Juvenile Detention Program. See figure 3 for a breakdown of staffing hours used by source. Each has advantages and disadvantages. “Staffing costs” represents the combination of permanent positions, overtime and temporary staff. Due to the nature of facility 24 hour staffing, it is expected that a mix of permanent staffing and supplemental overtime or temporary assistance is needed for maximum efficiency.

1. **Permanent detention officers** provide the base for daily operations. The core staffing plan included permanent staff juvenile detention officers. They provided coverage during the majority of shifts. Permanent staff provides a consistent base of knowledge and behavior to build on with other resources as needed. Permanent juvenile detention officers are the least flexible option due to contractual limitations in how they must be trained and used.

2. **Temporary “on-call” staff**, when available, augments difficult to fill shifts and cover unexpected overtime needs, providing flexibility. Temporary employees are often used to keep overtime for permanent staff at a lower level to preserve the workforce and stabilize cost. They also provide more flexible leave options for permanent staff. Temporary staff requires specialized training and supervision; and




Figure 3: Staffing hours by source (ea.30)

while they can be flexible, there may be limitations on the number of hours they can work and the type of duties they may perform. In 2012, use of temporary staff totaled 9,829 hours.

3. **Overtime and compensatory time** (“comp time” or “CT”) provide additional labor hours that augment permanent staff regular hours. The officers that provide basic staffing coverage also work on overtime when staff vacancies develop. Overtime is often the second largest budget item behind salary. While overtime is flexible, it is expensive to use. In 2013, a peak use year, 1,426 hours of comp time and 6,979 hours of overtime valued at approximately \$330,401 were used. Assuming 23 FTE (Full time equivalent employees) in 2013, that represents over 300 hours of overtime per employee that year.
4. **Adjusting services and service levels being provided.** When a sufficient number of qualified juvenile detention officers were not available to staff the facility, reduced services became a consideration. Reducing the number of pods in use, supporting fewer educational programs, less recreation time, and occasional limited use of lockdowns were common approaches to reduce staffing requirements. Management implemented increased lockdowns during 2013-2015; however, the procedure did not achieve their desired goals and was replaced with additional overtime within a few months.

Audit Purpose

Although the detention population declined, use of overtime continued to grow in the Clark County Juvenile Detention Program (Figure 4). Management was unable to maintain juvenile detention officer staffing levels while staying within its adopted overtime budget.




Figure 4: Detention Officer FTE, Overtime, and Juvenile Detainee Population (ea.5)

This performance audit was undertaken to determine:

1. Why overtime costs at the Clark County Juvenile Detention Facility rose significantly between 2013 and 2015, and;
2. If the facility was operating in a cost effective manner during that period.

While the audit focus is the period from 2013 to 2015, it is helpful to review long term trends.

The trends in *figure 5* highlight the relationship between the operational environment and staffing resources. The letters “ADP” in the bottom edge of *figure 5* refers to the average daily population of detainees during the year above it.




Figure 5: Staffing and Time Off Analysis Timeline (ea30) Note: “Budgeted FTE” is as of beginning of shown year

2007 – 2008: Stable Operations and Sufficient Staffing Capacity

In 2007 and 2008 there were few changes to the juvenile detention workforce, their workload, or their environment. The facility operated at or near capacity with four pods consistently filled, and a staff of 33 permanent detention officers providing 80% to 85% of the labor hours required through non-overtime work. The use of overtime and temporary staff declined even as leave taken by detention officers increased. This indicates sufficient and possibly excess staffing capacity during this period.

2009 – 2011: Staff Reductions; Increased Overtime and Temporary Staff

The nationwide recession continued in 2009 and Clark County instituted a county-wide 10% budget cut. In response, the Juvenile Detention Program eliminated three positions which reduced the number of detention officers to 30. Although the juvenile population had declined slightly, no detainee pods were closed and the same service levels were still required. By 2010, the program was consuming an increasing amount of overtime, comp time, and temporary staff to provide the same level of coverage. Management was not able to sustain operations within their budgeted levels for overtime.

2012 – 2015: Heavy use of Leave; Loss of Temporary Staff; Staff Reductions

In 2012, permanent Detention Officers were, as a group becoming less available to work their scheduled shift hours. This peaked in 2013 and began to slowly improve in 2014-2015. The greatest impact came from use of scheduled leave and FMLA (Family and Medical Leave Act) protected leave. During 2013-2015, an average of six employees were unavailable each month for various reasons, and up to three more employees were using FMLA, often at the same time. This reduced the available work force by up to nine employees monthly. Between 2013 and 2015 Juvenile Detention used 957 hours of time off for all reasons.

Use of temporary staff also declined during this time period. Whereas limited use of temporary staff had been successful through 2009, concern arose between 2010 and 2012 when temporary staff use was greatly increased to help control rapidly rising overtime and comp time. In 2013, management was served with an unfair labor practice (ULP) complaint based on alleged excessive use of temporary staff. Management ultimately determined that temporary staff represented too high a liability due to insufficient training and chose to end their use in 2015. The workload they represented was replaced with increased overtime and comp time by permanent Detention Officers.

As the number of juvenile detainees continued to decline, management closed off two pods and further reduced permanent staff. With fewer detainees and open pods, management believed the total number of hours required to provide services would be significantly reduced. Instead, overtime and comp time increased significantly to compensate for the increased use of leave and the loss of temporary staff even as the detainee population declined further. Seven juvenile detention officer positions were eliminated in 2013. Their budget was transferred to support positions in the JDAI program. By 2014 there were 23 permanent juvenile detention officers for the remaining two pods.

In 2013 management also realized they did not have the level of control over scheduling and overtime they needed to be successful. They recognized the need for additional expertise and sought assistance. Between 2013 and 2015 studies were completed by a former detention manager and Human Resources. These studies provided some insight into the causes of overtime in the past. In 2015, a Clark County Sheriff's Office Staffing Study ("CCSO Study") conducted by a nationally recognized corrections expert calculated the number of detention officers required to operate two pods. Audit confirmed the process.

While we agree with the CCSO Study's approach, management can further improve decisions and reduce overtime through application of performance analysis and management.

Findings & Recommendations

Finding 1: Analysis of operational data will improve overtime management

As part of the CCSO Study, Juvenile Court management provided employee work data for the CCSO Study to use as the basis of their analysis. Juvenile Court estimated based on their current work schedule, that seven detention officers were required on day shift; six on swing shift; and four on night shifts to fully staff required detention officer posts for two pods. These "posts" represent the positions which must always be filled to provide sufficient detention services for juvenile detainees. Activities of each day may require changes to this estimate. For example, fewer posts were needed on weekends as there were fewer external activities. In general, the estimate resulted in 117 posts to fill each week which translates into approximately 48,672 hours on post each year. However payroll records show the

program used a total of 54,481 hours on post during 2015, the first full year of two pod operations (Figure 6). This number generally does not include “non-post hours” such as leave and training; they must be added later as administrative or “non-post” requirement.

Staff (FTE used) >	33	33	30	30	30	30	23	26	29
# Pods in Use >	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	2	2
ADP (Juveniles)	58	62	53	46	47	39	33	24	21
Staff per ADP Juvenile	0.57	0.53	0.57	0.65	0.64	0.77	0.70	1.08	1.38
Staff Required per Pod	8.25	8.25	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.67	13.00	14.50
Year	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>
Detention Officer Hours	57,924	61,580	57,521	51,286	51,062	51,599	54,153	49,164	42,401
Temporary Contract	4,869	4,813	4,281	6,703	8,834	9,829	4,363	2,381	341
Overtime (OT)	3,206	2,351	1,890	2,456	3,801	4,916	6,979	8,932	10,021
Compensatory Time (CT)	727	362	142	368	735	1,131	1,426	1,333	1,718
Total Hours	66,726	69,106	63,833	60,813	64,432	67,475	66,921	61,810	54,481

Figure 6: Staff Requirements over Time and Post Hours (ea.30)

Further examination of post hours indicates the elimination of the seven positions in 2014 contributed to overtime in 2015. As a result, only 42,401 of the 54,481 hours used were supplied by Detention Officers on regular time. This gap in post hours was largely filled with overtime as the use of temporary staff was ended during this same period.

We noted that it took about twice as many staff per detainee (ADP) in 2015 with two active pods (0.57) as it did in 2007 with four active pods (1.38) as shown in Figure 6. We identified two reasons for this relationship. First, staffing levels did not change smoothly with detainee population; they changed in steps. Adding detainees required no new resources until a new pod needed to be opened. At that time, a complete new pod staff was required. (Appendix G, Detailed Juvenile Detention Staffing) Second, the increased use of employee time off on multiple shifts using leave of all types reduced the available pool of workers available, driving the need for additional staffing from any source.

Juvenile Court management recorded individual information did not track compiled data of any type or key trends on detainee operations between 2012 and 2015. Individual data was recorded inconsistently, and could not be aggregated for common queries. Therefore, we were unable to evaluate the post hours required for two pod operations. We found evidence that they had collected and used some staffing performance data prior to 2013, but ended the program when they adopted new records software. Reports and data that were available used fields and abbreviations inconsistently and were not subject to any quality review process. To compile a report on the results of operations would have required manual sorting by personnel with specialized knowledge to review and interpret elements of incident reports, grievances, and other records.

While we were unable to replicate or verify the estimated post hours used in the CCSO Study (see previous paragraph) the findings and recommendations are still relevant. The study focused on completing a portion of the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) model staffing analysis. It recommended a complete NIC staffing analysis be conducted. More details on the NIC model are provided in Appendix F.

Even if Detention Services chooses not to complete a full NIC staffing analysis, operational performance data should be identified, tracked, and analyzed. This information is critical in evaluating service levels and determining appropriate demands for staffing. Lack of performance data and analysis also makes it difficult for management to see progress or focus results on high priority aspects of the operation.

According to the NIC model, data and analysis should include:

- Profile of juvenile detainee behavior, population, and operational environment
- Post related time spent on officer activities like detainee supervision, transfers, intake, etc.
- Time spent on other officer details such as escorting maintenance personnel, etc.
- Compare data to activities required by law such as the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)
- Compare detainee trends, officer activities, etc. with estimated post hours required

Recommendations

1a. We recommend management evaluate the 5,809 hour difference between the post hours estimated and the post hours used in 2015, identifying which number is the most accurate. It should be used for 2016 and newer analysis.

1b. We recommend management track, analyze, and use operational performance data on an annual basis. The results of the analysis should be used to evaluate service levels and estimate future post hours needed.

Finding 2: Additional efforts are required to manage non-post hours

Scheduled time off in the form of vacation and sick leave are the largest components of non-post hours for detention officers. The Juvenile Detention Officers’ Guild contract allows five officers to schedule leave during a single shift. Under the most severe situation, there were occasionally up to six more officers out for unscheduled (sickness or FMLA) reasons for which management had no control representing up to about a third of the permanent workforce. Contract obligations during this time restricted management’s ability to control non-post hours.

Use of scheduled leave by detention officers is highest during traditional vacation seasons, peaking in June and to a lesser degree around November and December. This

reduces the pool of officers available to fill unscheduled absences as well as management’s ability to provide coverage for required post hours. With no other resources to draw from, overtime is used to fill staffing shortages. Historical trends show a large number of simultaneous absences due to scheduled leave, unscheduled leave, and FMLA from early 2014 to mid-2015. (Figure 7)




Figure 7: Seasonal Variations Drive Costs (ea3)

The NIC staffing analysis estimates how much each full time employee is available to fill post hours by subtracting the average non-post hours per person from 2,080. The result is referred to as the “net hours worked”. The CCSO Study used detention officers’ leave records from 2012-2015 provided by Juvenile Court to determine non-post hours, and calculated net hours worked at 1664 hours on average.

Recommendations

2a. We recommend management calculate net hours worked annually to identify current and likely future trends for non-post hours and staff availability.

2b. We recommend management work with the Detention Officers Guild to reduce the impact of leave. Some options include:

- Modify the collective bargaining agreement to change the number of staff allowed to be off at the same time, perhaps expressing it as a ratio. The current limit was established when there was a detention officer pool in excess of 35 FTE of permanent juvenile detention officers and additional use of temporary staff.
- Examine trends in the use of unscheduled leave to identify drivers. For example, higher rates of unscheduled leave on weekends may indicate a need to evaluate scheduling. Seasonal patterns may identify other short term gaps in coverage.
- Evaluate opportunities to allow and schedule increased use of temporary or part time staff in advance of months where leave use peaks. This may afford more leave flexibility while addressing short term gaps in coverage within contractual limits.

Finding 3: Current scheduling practices may reduce effectiveness of coverage

Using the accepted estimated 48,672 post hours and the 1,664 net hours worked per officer, the CCSO Study determined 29 FTE were necessary to staff the facility. At 2,080 hours per employee per year, this should generate 60,320 regular hours to cover post and non-post hours such as leave. It does not provide time for employee emergencies beyond historic patterns, or major changes in use of time off, health, family or other extenuating problems. For a complete discussion of shift staffing see *Appendix G*.

Juvenile Court determined that the CCSO staffing model should be based on a “7/6/4” weekday shift (7 FTE for day shift, 6 FTE for swing shift and 4 FTE on night shift) for two pod operation. Management reported that in late 2015 or early 2016 they began using a modified “8/8/5” (*figure 9*) staffing schedule instead of the “7/6/4” model. They added four officers to the rotation to offset unscheduled leave taken by staff that does not show for duty due to illness or other problems. Management states decisions were made on a daily basis which posts to fill based on which employees showed up for work, so the total post hours used should have been less than a fully staffed “8/8/5” schedule at year end.

Still, the practice of overscheduling may have resulted in extra staff on shift if all officers showed up for work and extras were not released. This may have been another factor in the overtime hours used in 2015 that was not included in the staffing model. Ideally, most labor used should have been permanent detention officers on standard time, supplemented by temporary detention officers. Finally, overtime should have been used to bridge periods of time where temporary shortages existed.

FTE required by shift and day of the week								days/wk	hours/day	hr/yr	
<u>8/8/5 Schedule</u>		Mon	Tue	We	Thu	Fr	Sa	Su	FTE	FTE	Total
Days		8	8	8	8	8	7	7	54	432	22,464
Swing		8	8	8	8	8	8	8	56	448	23,296
Graveyard		<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>33</u>	264	13,728
										total	59,488
FTE /	Day >>	21	21	21	21	21	19	19	143	shifts post total	
<i>Figure 8: Scheduling Option 2 (ea.1)</i>									1144	hours	

Overlapping shifts can reduce overtime use

Currently, basic staffing for a 24 hour period consists entirely of three end-to-end eight hour shifts. While this simplifies staff assignments and provides consistency, it does not provide cost effective staffing back up resources.

Another option is to augment the primary work shift with supplementary overlap shifts. Two of the simplest ways to apply overlap in a small organization would be:

- a. Adding an officer on a 12 hour shift, overlapping two hours before and after an 8 hour shift.
- b. Adding an officer to an eight hour shift that is offset from the existing start times by 4 hours.

Both of these options allow a single employee to provide “back up” coverage for up to a half shift on two different shifts; it can provide extra resources covering all three shifts using only two persons. Efficiency is enhanced if tasks requiring additional officers are shifted to take advantage of the overlap.

An organization can conduct a “dry run” to test the potential advantages of a supplementary shift against recent past schedules to see which configuration provides the most value. This analysis should be done in conjunction with shift leads to determine the best combination of value and effectiveness. The Guild’s input should be considered.

Recommendation

3. We recommend the Juvenile Court Management evaluate alternative schedules for providing coverage. Temporary staffing requirements should be updated and adjusted as part of a periodic staffing analysis. For example, using relief shifts that overlap normal shifts could reduce the impact of unscheduled absences and overtime.

Finding 4: Effective use of temporary resources improves operations

Use of supplementary staff

“Temporary staff” employees were employment agency provided personnel with limited specific training. They had the advantage of being readily available and relatively low cost. Temporary staff was a useful addition to the workforce when four pods were open and there was flexibility in how they could be deployed. Between 4,000 and 7,000 hours per year of temporary agency-supplied staff was used

between 2007 and 2010, a relatively stable period. We found no record of any safety incidents caused by temporary staff training limitations.

The use of temporary staff was beneficial to both management and labor, providing coverage at a reasonable cost while providing a gateway for juvenile detention officers, some of which were hired as permanent employees and still work for the County. If the limitations on “part time detention officers” as currently being pursued by management and The Guild are too restrictive, this temporary staff model may still be viable with minor changes to training and scheduling requirements.

Part time juvenile detention officers were a potential alternative to increase flexibility of the staff on regular time. However, to be viable there need to be a large enough pool of part time officers able to provide adequate coverage throughout the year. If making them “part time juvenile detention officers” creates a barrier to their scheduling flexibility, establishing them as a developmental position through an agency again could be effective.

There are a variety of ways that management and employees can work together to control or reduce overtime use. These include:

- a. Modifying flexibility of existing shifts – already in progress with use of 8/8/6 shift staffing.
- b. Adding shifts – consider a small shift of one or two officers with shifts that overlap 4 hours between two existing shifts.
- c. Expanding use of contract temporary staff or part time juvenile detention officers in positions between what they used to be as untrained staff and the current vision as actual fully trained detention officers limited to part time work.
- d. A complete externally contracted detention officer guard force - explore the cost/benefit of contracting all juvenile detention officer services.

Recommendations

4a. We recommend that management expand the part-time juvenile detention officer pilot program identified in the 2016-2018 collective bargaining agreement to include three to six qualified temporary officers to help cover staff during training and unexpected absences.

4b. We recommend that management, in consultation with labor, evaluate and test the use of overlapping shifts to address recurring staffing vacancies.

Finding 5: A performance management framework should help improve processes

It is an industry best practice for detention facilities to conduct a rigorous regular review of the performance and needs of their organization as well as their ability to provide the required services and service levels. There are multiple national organizations with guidance and tools to conduct this work. Developing and maintaining the major elements of a professional, 24-hour staffing plan fit well within the *Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle (PDCA)* continuous process improvement framework used world-wide and made famous by W. Edwards Deming. (See model, figure 9).

This framework can be adapted to the needs of Juvenile Detention. Each phase has specific action steps identified, with tools to assist in establishing service levels needed, evaluating resources available, determining how to deploy them and finally evaluating performance and adjusting staffing as a

continuous cycle. Use of this framework supports a structured, disciplined approach to collecting, reviewing and acting on performance data regularly.




Figure 9: Plan-Do-Check-Act Basic Concept (ea.32)

Major elements of the PCDA framework

(See full framework, figure 10 on page 19)

- **Focus:** Main purpose, action or form of output expected for the phase
- **Action Steps:** Within each phase of the PDCA model are sequential action steps consistent with those you will find in many organizations using a professional staffing process; they have been modified to also be consistent with guidance from major detention organizations.
- **Tools:** National organizations familiar with risk based 24-hour staffing have guides, courses, instructional manuals and other tools to assist in self-assessment, staffing and scheduling.
- **Key Data:** Performance data should be produced as part of each phase of the process. Suggested key Juvenile Detention measures and indicators that would assist with the process are identified within each phase.
- **Related Issues:** Audit findings aligned with the appropriate phase of the process.


Recommendations

5a. We recommend management adopt the PDCA professional framework to support regular collection of key operational, financial, and employee performance data along with an annual staffing analysis.

5b. We recommend the Juvenile Court conduct a full self-assessment and staffing analysis consistent with NIC, PREA or JDAI standards and best practices within two years of completing this audit. This will help management and staff members explain nuances of their resources and needs, as well as meet compliance requirements and improve budget communications.

Audit Summary

Excessive overtime costs are unlikely in the future if the Juvenile Court adopts recommended staffing management, data collection, and performance management practices identified in this audit.



Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1: Analysis of operational data will improve overtime management

1a. We recommend management evaluate the 5,809 hour difference between the post hours estimated and the post hours used in 2015, identifying which number is the most accurate. It should be used for 2016 and newer analysis.

1b. We recommend management track, analyze, and use operational performance data on an annual basis. The results of the analysis should be used to evaluate service levels and estimate future post hours needed.

Finding 2: Additional efforts are required to manage non-post hours

2a. We recommend management calculate net hours worked annually to identify current and likely future trends for non-post hours and staff availability.

2b. We recommend management work with the Detention Officers Guild to reduce the impact of leave.

Finding 3: Current scheduling practices may reduce effectiveness of coverage

3. We recommend the Juvenile Court Management evaluate alternative schedules for providing coverage. Temporary staffing requirements should be updated and adjusted as part of a periodic staffing analysis. For example, using relief shifts that overlap normal shifts could reduce the impact of unscheduled absences and overtime.

Finding 4: Effective use of temporary resources improves operations

4a. We recommend that management expand the part-time juvenile detention officer pilot program identified in the 2016-2018 collective bargaining agreement to include three to six qualified temporary officers to help cover staff during training and unexpected absences.

4b. We recommend that management, in consultation with labor, evaluate and test the use of overlapping shifts to address recurring staffing vacancies.

Finding 5: Performance management framework should help improve processes

5a. We recommend management adopt the PDCA professional framework to support regular collection of key operational, financial, and employee performance data along with an annual staffing analysis.

5b. We recommend the Juvenile Court conduct a full self-assessment and staffing analysis consistent with NIC, PREA or JDAI standards and best practices within two years of completing this audit. This will help management and staff members explain nuances of their resources and needs, as well as meet compliance requirements and improve budget communications.

Appendix B: Key Event Timeline

Note: The audit focused on data between 2013 and 2015. Some key events outside that time are included in this list to enhance understanding of context.

- (2009) Detention Services operated with a total of 30 permanent juvenile detention officers supplemented by temporary staff, overtime and compensatory time.
- (2010-2012) **No required staff training** was documented for most employees between 2010 and 2012 and no training plan was available. Most training was conducted on overtime, and management reported that training was reduced to reduce overtime.
- (2013) In December **Pod 4 was closed** due to decreased census. Training on overtime increased as did the use of time off. Cost of operations rose at an increasing rate.
- (2014) Detention Services was **reduced by 7 positions** to 23 permanent juvenile detention officers based on the reduced juvenile census. The 7 positions were transferred out of detention services to support the alternatives initiative and community-based programs.
- (2014) Use of Family Medical Leave Act and other protected leave time off peaked in 2014-2015, but FMLA eligible needs continued beyond 2015. **Use of all forms of time off combined to reduce detention staff work availability** and increase overtime.
- (2014) In September **Pod 3 was closed** due to a further decrease in demand for detention services. Staff use of time off continued to be very high compared to pre-2013 levels.
- (2015) Reversal of juvenile detention officer staffing reductions began: To attempt to control overtime, **three former detention positions were returned** to juvenile detention officer positions.
- (2016) The Superior Court Bench determined that transferring seven positions to the detention alternatives program **had been more expensive than anticipated** and remaining positions needed to be returned. Intervention resulted in management changes within the Juvenile Court.
- (2016-2017) **Four additional juvenile detention officers were transferred back to Detention Services**, raising the number of juvenile detention officers authorized to 29 FTE, nearly at the 2009 pre-crisis staffing level.
- (2017) A **new labor contract** was approved. It included a pilot program to hire and train part time juvenile detention officers with improved capabilities and better controls under a temporary contract. It also included “blackout days” which addressed FMLA and training days, giving management improved flexibility in scheduling.

Appendix C: Abbreviation and Keyword Glossary

- **ADP:** Average Daily Population of juvenile detainees, a measure of workload; represents how many detainees were in-processed and held for at least four hours during the 24 hour period, so it may exceed the overnight capacity of the facility.
- **Augmented or Augmentation:** Adding additional labor from other than basic non-premium work hours. Includes contract, compensatory time, and overtime.
- **CRIPA:** Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980
- **FMLA:** Family and Medical Leave Act
- **FTE:** Full Time Equivalent Employee
- **JD:** Juvenile Detention
- **JDAI:** Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative
- **NIC:** National Institute of Corrections
- **NIJ:** National Institute of Justice
- **OJJDP:** Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
- **PDCA:** Plan, Do, Check, Act cycle also known as the Deming or Shewhart cycle; a performance management framework developed in the US but popular worldwide.
- **Pod:** A living unit within the Clark County Detention Facility that houses youth. A pod has room for either 13 or 15 youth depending on its configuration. There are four pods available for use.
- **Post Analysis:** Analysis of a post (position) to identify the work hours needed for full time operation.
- **Post Hours:** Total hours needed per year for a required position. Calculations include breaks, lunch and should include training.
- **PREA:** National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape (also known as “PREA Standards”), established by the US Department of Justice Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2012 and updated in 2016. Set minimum standards of safety for prisons, jails and juvenile facilities.
- **Relief Factor:** The number of “FTE” needed to keep a post staffed for 24 hours. A relief factor should take into account vacation, sick leave, training and other competitors for time.
- **Shift Relief Factor:** The number of hours (or days) required to fill a post during a given shift, when the person who is regularly assigned to that post on that shift is unavailable to fill that post because he or she is occupied elsewhere, either on annual leave, sick leave, attending training, injured, or otherwise not available for assignment to that post. To account for the time that the regularly assigned person is not available, additional staff time must be allocated to that post to ensure the duties assigned to that post are completed.

Appendix D: Audit Methodology

Audit Objectives:

- 1) Determine if the Juvenile Detention Program staffing was cost effective between 2013 and 2015.
- 2) Determine how budgetary problems affected the staff environment between 2013 and 2015.
- 3) Determine how the budgetary problems affected detainees between 2013 and 2015.

Scope:

Examine staffing factors at the Clark County Juvenile Detention Center facility from 2009 to 2016 and identify the major cost and labor drivers during this time frame to determine if it was operating in a cost effective manner. Identify any policies, procedures or events that may have had a quantifiable effect on the cost of operations.

Guidance:

This audit includes the Juvenile Detention Program in Clark County, Washington. Focus is on operations between 2013 and 2015 and the fiscal effects of management decisions during this time.

- Identify the major cost and labor factors affecting operations during 2013-2015.
- Identify new programs or initiatives that may have affected staffing or budget during this time.
- Identify policies, procedures and events that may have had an effect on the cost of operations.
- Only identify issues within the target years.

Methodology:

- 1) Identify the major factors likely to have contributed to the labor related fiscal problems experienced by the Juvenile Detention Program between 2013 and 2015.
- 2) Gather data – external assistance
 - Work with HR to determine what they have in the way of data related to staffing or overtime issues with Juvenile Detention operations.
 - Work with the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office to determine if there are any unfair labor practices (ULPs), grievances or related complaints in between 2013 and 2015 related to this subject.
 - Work with the Budget Office to determine if there were any key budget decisions related to Juvenile Detention Operations made during the time of interest.
- 3) Quantify the effects of contributing factors and determine how significant a contributor they were.
 - JDAI implementation (shifting staff from detention)
 - Lack of data driven analysis of workload, major factors
 - Inability of management to control leave effectively within the contract
 - Reduction of overtime budget during key years
 - Contract with labor requires good relationship between management and labor to control costs.
 - Ending the temporary staff program
 - No training is identified as a discrete line item in budget, there are no records of significant training

- 4) Provide recommendations to reduce the risk of this confluence of events reoccurring in the future.
 - Maintain performance data related to staffing and the detention population
 - Identify training requirements (PREA, JDAI, WA) and resource them so that staff receives adequate knowledge, skills and ability for their jobs

- 5) Conclude on the objectives.
 - Objective 1: Juvenile Detention Program staffing was not cost effective between 2013 and 2015.
 - Objectives 2 & 3: No conclusion identified. A sensitive information management letter was issued to the governance authority consistent with GAGAS 7.08 and 7.41.

Appendix E: Pending New Washington State Guidelines

Below is an extract of the draft Washington Association of Juvenile Court Administrators (AJCA) Juvenile Detention Center Guidelines dated March 22, 2017. The guidelines are expected to be finalized some time in 2018.

1. 1B-2.1 Periodic (possibly annual) criminal record checks for staff would be required
2. 1B-3.1 Budget must contain sufficient funds to properly train staff
3. 1B-3.2 Required training before given responsibility for direct care and supervision of youth
(Procedures orientation, working conditions, employee rights, Prison Rape Elimination Act staff training, overview of field, first aid, defensive tactics)
4. 1B-3.3 Full time staff must attend the training academy, preferably within the first six months
5. 1B-3.4 Written training policy and plan with minimum of 16 hours of annual training
(Includes suggested topics)
6. 1B-3.5 Organizations need policies and procedures for maintenance of training records
7. 1B-4.1 Organizations need a code of ethics (includes reference to model code)
8. 1B-5.2 Organizations need written policy & procedures to provide a safe, secure & healthful working environment for staff
9. 2C-1.1 Organizations need written policy & procedures for programming that will be part of the daily schedule
10. 2C-3.1 Organizations need written policy & procedures about youth access to recreational activities

Appendix F: National Institutes of Corrections Staffing Tool Summary

The National Institute of Correction's ten step process is considered a best practice for a staffing analysis. In short, it involves ten general steps, summarized below:

- Step 1. Profile the Facility- describing the context in which staffing occurs
- Step 2. Calculate Net Annual Work Hours- understanding how many hours we really derive from each full time position, and getting the data and math right
- Step 3. Develop a Facility Activity Schedule- examining hour-to-hour levels of activity in the jail, and identifying opportunities for new efficiencies
- Step 4. Develop the Staff Coverage Plan- determining what type of staff are needed, where, and when, and with what exceptions
- Step 5. Complete a Staff Summary- a first look at the level of staffing
- Step 6. Develop a Schedule- finding efficient and effective ways to deploy to meet coverage needs
- Step 7. Evaluate, Revise, and Improve the Plan- the equalizer-- identifying deficiencies in the plan before it is implemented
- Step 8. Calculate Operational Costs- asking for the right amount of resources
- Step 9. Prepare a Report- documenting your findings
- Step 10. Implement the Plan and Monitor the Results- continuously fine tuning the plan as it is implemented.

Appendix G: Detailed Juvenile Detention Staffing

Staffing Standards

While there is debate within the industry whether a specified minimum staffing level should be required for juvenile detention services, there is general consensus that providing a staffing standard that results in about one juvenile detention officer to every eight youths during the day, and one juvenile detention officer for every sixteen youths during sleeping periods usually provided sufficient oversight for a safe environment. During the time frame of this audit (2013-2015) PREA standards were usually considered optional as best practices. Since 2015, all juvenile detention facilities were given until October 1, 2017 to integrate them as PREA standards.

Detention Scheduling

Juvenile Detention is a staff intense service. To provide a safe and healthy environment for a high-risk group of youths requires a 24-hour staffing plan (juvenile detention officers as well as other dedicated service delivery staff) for education programs, medical and dental care and mental health. The cost of service is driven by the number of juveniles being detained, building design and the required staff.

In 2013-2015, staffing for juvenile detention consisted of three, eight hour shifts of juvenile detention officers with a Lead or Acting Lead for each shift. Shifts were referred to as Day, Swing and Graveyard. The size of the shift crew varied with the number of living pods open (Four possible, each with 13 or 15 youth capacity) as well as the shift activity level. As of 2015, no more than two pods were used and the average daily population (ADP) from 2013 to 2015 decreased from 33 in 2013 to 21 in 2015, reducing the demand for secure detention facilities.

Each of the shifts required different levels of staffing based on the population and activities during the shift. Each day, a number of scheduled employees were unavailable for multiple reasons, reducing the available staff and forcing overtime. The approximate staffing schedule that the Juvenile Court Administrator used as a goal to provide safe operations and reasonable efficiency was the 7/6/4 schedule shown below:

<u>7/6/4 Schedule</u>	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	
Day	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	
Swing	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
<u>Graveyard</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	
Total FTEs								
>>	17	17	17	17	17	16	16	= 117 Posts per week X 8 hr shifts

Table G1: 7/6/4 schedule as provided by Juvenile Court Administrator

At times, this schedule was modified to include fewer juvenile detention officers on shift based on limited availability of staff. One result of reduced staff availability was a reduction in classroom time, recreation and group activities. This was documented by an increase in grievances filed by juveniles.

Adjusting Capacity

Based on historic availability of employees, to consistently fill a post every day for a year takes between 1.6 and 1.85 employees to compensate for training, time off, and unexpected unavailability. According to the CCSO Study, to staff the facility with juvenile detention officers at a sustainable level for 2 pods required 1.85 FTE x 17 positions on a 7/6/4 schedule or approximately 30 to 31 permanent officers to fully staff the 17 positions.




Figure G2: Day or swing shift schedule; subtract one FTE for a non-court day

Calculating the post factor (personnel required to fully staff a position for 24 hours) to be used was based on a time (2012-2015) when the detention officer resource pool was unstable, with large swings in available permanent staff, time off, and overtime being taken.




Fig G3: Day or swing shift schedule without court

Opening (or closing) a pod required adding (or subtracting) either one or two staff to each shift depending on which pod was opened or closed. When a new pod was opened, it provided an immediate capacity for 13 or 15 additional juveniles in a single step.

When they opened a pod, the staffing cost was essentially the same for the first youth as it was for the last youth that fills it up. The cost of opening another pod was somewhat variable depending on multiple staffing factors including:

- Which pod it was – opening the third pod (upstairs) required adding an additional “rover”
- Total employees available to schedule (Permanent and temporary)
- Employee absences and illnesses
- Day of the week (weekend staffing lighter) and court events scheduled
- Medical status of the detainees
- Transportation
- Training scheduled

Regardless of how many pods were scheduled to be opened, three variables came n to play: 1) If the pod is at capacity 2) Availability of staff for the number of shifts we need to supplement, and 3) Any other considerations such as scheduled court, medical reasons or special circumstances.

Expanding from **three to four pods** without changing the service level required two additional juvenile detention officers on the day and swing shift, with no change to graveyard. For two pods of capacity, it usually required 16 to 17 juvenile detention officers to operate the facility for 24 hours.

Applying a model like this, we can develop an estimate of the number of hours to budget for each year based on the service level and post staffing required.




Fig G4: Graveyard shift schedule

Post hours are the number of staff hours needed to cover all shifts for a “post” or full time position for 24 hour operation. For example, to staff an operation that requires 7 positions on day-6 positions on swing and 4 positions on graveyard shift (a “7\6\4 shift”) would require 48,672 hours per year of work on three shifts. Adjusting for vacation, sickness, training and other expected absences, and it would require 1.8 employees to fill each position – so staffing 17 full time positions for 24 hours a day five days a week plus 16 positions two days a week would require (16.7 x 1.8= 30) about 30 actual full time employees.

Calculating staff required

Post Hours	1 shift with court each day							7	8	52
2 pods required (From analysis)								days/wk	hours/day	hr/yr
<u>7/6/4 Schedule</u>	Mon	Tue	Wed	Th	Fri	Sat	Sun			
Days	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	47	376	19552
Swing	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	42	336	17472
Graveyard	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	28	224	11648
									total	48672
FTE	shifts >>	17	17	17	17	17	16	16	117	shifts post ttl
									936	hours
									FTE needed	29.2

Table G5: 7/6/4 schedule

What they consumed in resources

An historical chart shows due to various reasons, a greater number of hours are required: By adding the various types of labor available to fill positions, (salary, overtime, and temporary labor) we were able to establish how much time was actually being used:

- When four pods were open, it required a total of about 80k to 84k hours of labor (add all elements in column).
- When three pods were in use, it required about 72k hours of staffing.

Alternative model

We found the organization was not able to consistently rely upon the basic staffing model to generate the 49,000 hours of post time required each year. They developed an alternative plan that consisted of adding “back up” staff to each shift to compensate for employees that did not show up in the quantities expected. This was intended to minimize the use of excess overtime:

Scheduled Option								days/wk	hours/day	hr/yr								
<u>8/8/5 Schedule</u>								Mon	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa	Su				
Days	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	54	432	22464								
Swing	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	56	448	23296								
Graveyard	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	33	264	13728								
								total		59488								
FTE	shifts >>	21	21	21	21	21	19	19	143	shifts post ttl								
								1144 hours										
Staffing Hours 2 pods								FTE needed		35.75								

Required staffing weekday is 17 psns x 8 hr per day x 261 weekdays 35,496 hours

Required staffing weekend is 16 psns x 8 hr per day x 104 weekend days 13,312 hours

Table G6: 8/8/5 schedule

48,808 hours Base case hrs per year work

While it has flaws, this simple scheduling model has provided some resiliency and has generally met the needs of Juvenile Detention, albeit at a higher cost through the use of overtime. It has generated about 60k hours of annual juvenile detention officer labor, the number of hours needed to generate just under 49,000 final hours after unexcused or unexpected absences, planned time off and other distractions.

Calculating Coverage and Staffing Plans

A staffing plan requires knowledge of precisely how many of what type resources are available for shift work. With this knowledge, analysis can predict how many resources are reasonable for the work to be done. Some recommended key metrics provided by the CCSO Study included:

- NHW – Total hours you can plan on having the employee(s) available for the year. Ideally it is 2080 hours but the reality is a combination of time off, sickness, training and other factors reduces availability. For Juvenile Detention, their group NHW was 1664 or they were available for about 80% of the time.
- Shift Relief Factor – How many actual people (based on history) have been required to fill a single position 7 days a week, 24 hours a day? Juvenile Detention requires 1.85 full time employees to fill a single juvenile detention officer position all year. (1.85)
- Post Factor=Staff required for one post times three shifts per day. Represents the Shift Relief Factor x 3 shifts, or 5.54 juvenile detention officers per day per post. (5.54)
- TDA=Total days available to work per employee annually (208)
- NDW= Net eight hour days worked per employee per year; used for relief factor calculation (198 days)
- Post Hours=Hours required for annual operation (count all staffing posts=117) *8 hours= 936 Hours per week *52 weeks = 48,672 hours)

Total FTE required to staff all posts including historic unavailability and absence rate=post factor divided by NHW = 29.25 FTE.

Two pods represented half the capacity of the facility. Starting from a high of 62 detainees in 2008, Juvenile Detention managed to reduce the daily census to 33 in 2013. The decision was made to close two pods and reduce staff appropriately. Permanent staff was reduced from 30 to 23, and use of temporary staff was winding down as expected.

Appendix H: Management Comments



CLARK COUNTY
JUVENILE JUSTICE
CENTER

CHRISTINE SIMONSMIEIER
JUVENILE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

500 West 11th Street
PO Box 5000
Vancouver, Washington 98666-5000

Telephone (360) 397-2201
Administration FAX (360) 397-2246
FAX (360) 397-6109

SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON FOR CLARK
COUNTY

JAMES E. RULLI
ROBERT A. LEWIS
SCOTT A. COLLIER
DANIEL L. STAHNKE
GREGORY M. GONZALES
DAVID E. GREGERSON
SUZAN L. CLARK
BERNARD F. VELJACIC
DEREK J. VANDERWOOD
JOHN P. FAIRGRIEVE
JUDGES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

CARIN S. SCHIENBERG
DAYANN M. LIEBMAN
JENNIFER K. SNIDER
SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER

CLARK COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER

*We will put our energy and resources into the future.
Our focus will be on what needs to be healed, what needs to be repaired, what needs to be learned.*

June 4, 2018

Clark County Auditor's Office
P.O. Box 5000
Vancouver, WA

Thank you for the opportunity to review and respond to the Juvenile Detention Overtime Audit. The court would like to take this opportunity to share the steps that we began to take in late 2015 and early 2016 to address the financial impact of our overtime usage. These steps have brought the overtime usage in line with our adopted budget.

As mentioned in Appendix B: Key Event Timeline of the audit, we began returning staff to our detention unit in 2015, returning most staff by 2016. These transfers brought the detention staffing level up to 29 full time employees. This was the recommended number of staff identified in the staffing analysis conducted in 2015 by Commander Ric Bishop of the Clark County Sheriff's Office. Additionally the Court was able to make internal budget adjustments that increased the detention overtime budget to within range of projections estimated through internal analysis of overtime expenditures.

Additional tools were developed through negotiation and collaboration with the Juvenile Detention Officer's Guild. They are: reinstating the temporary on call staffing program and the ability for management to initiate 'black out' days on the scheduled time off calendar. The on call program and the blackout days provide a level of flexibility to management when unscheduled time off occurs. Both are valuable tools in managing unexpected time off while avoiding the use of overtime. The temporary on call program delivers a significant cost saving as well as being a valuable training tool for recruitment of permanent full time staff.

As of April 2018 the overtime budget is 4.9% underspent. This is despite having incurred 4 unexpected full time absences due to FMLA protected illness or injury during the current biennium. The above mentioned tools, along with the recommendations provided by this audit, support a positive outcome for the Juvenile Courts ability to maintain and respond to overtime costs moving forward.

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this audit. The process and recommendations will be helpful moving forward. Additional thanks to the Clark County Sheriff's Office and the Juvenile Detention Officers Guild for sharing their resources, ideas, and collaboration as we worked through this issue.

Sincerely,

Christine Simonsmeier
Juvenile Court Administrator